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THE MAGIC OF DISNEY: TURNING BEST PRACTICES INTO
STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE
Mireille Bahri
I.

∗

INTRODUCTION

Corporate law has undergone somewhat of a transformation in
recent years, largely as a result of such scandals as Enron and World1
Com. If it is assumed that a failure in governance is partially, if not
wholly, responsible for these corporate debacles, director conduct
should be a focus of reform in the future. Therefore, the common
law business judgment rule should play a role in this reform. The
business judgment rule seeks to protect board members’ decisional
2
authority, yet in doing so it may give them too much discretion. This
Comment asserts that the business judgment rule, as applied against
the standards of director conduct implicitly proposed by the Dela3
ware Court of Chancery in In re Disney Derivative Litigation, may be an
appropriate mechanism for courts to meaningfully review board decisions, thereby ensuring the good faith efforts of directors in their corporate undertakings.
The Disney decision provides useful guidelines that, while (according to the court) inapplicable in the case itself, may steer courts,
and directors themselves, in the right direction in the future. As pre4
vious Delaware case law indicates, best practices, as articulated by

∗
J.D., May 2007, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A. (Economics), 2001,
Vassar College.
1
Mark J. Loewenstein, The Quiet Transformation of Corporate Law, 57 SMU L. REV.
353, 353 (2004).
2
See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary
Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 409–10 (2005).
3
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005),
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
4
See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
1996).
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courts, can evolve into standards of conduct; the Disney decision has
5
the potential to create such standards for directors.
Despite corporate failures, courts continue to give directors the
6
protection of the business judgment rule, perhaps because of the
7
adoption by many of the “gatekeeper” theory of corporate failure.
This theory blames the failures on the inadequacies of the corporate
gatekeepers—the corporations’ independent auditors and analysts—
and ignores, to some extent, the role played by directors in the down8
fall of their corporations. An alternative theory treats the collapses
as a true failure of corporate governance, thus implicating the busi9
ness judgment rule and its role in protecting directors from liability.
Those that subscribe to this latter theory argue that if directors are
allowed to act without limitation on their powers, scandals are likely
10
to continue to occur.
No matter the cause, the wave of corporate scandals roused a
hope that there would be a shift toward imposing more stringent
standards on corporate directors at the state level—standards
11
deemed necessary to prevent similar problems in the future. This
Comment will explore the events leading up to this anticipated shift
and will discuss the transformation of Delaware corporate law since
the failures of Enron, WorldCom, and others, in considering whether
such a shift has occurred and whether such a shift is likely to ever
occur.

5
See H. Lowell Brown, The Corporate Director’s Compliance Oversight Responsibility in
the Post Caremark Era, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 6 (2001) (noting that the Caremark decision “has fueled the discussion of the board’s role in ensuring compliance”).
6
Fairfax, supra note 2, at 410. For a discussion of the business judgment rule,
see infra Part III.B.
7
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron: “It’s About the Gatekeepers, Stupid,” 57
BUS. LAW. 1403 (2002), reprinted in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR
IMPLICATIONS 125, 127 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
8
Id. at 127, 130–31 (defining “gatekeepers” as those “reputational intermediaries who provide verification and certification services to investors”).
9
Id. at 125.
10
See Fairfax, supra note 2, at 394–95.
11
Rolin P. Bissel, Delaware’s Disney Decision: A Star is Born?, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER,
Vol. 20, No. 49, Oct. 7, 2005, available at http://www.wlf.org/upload/
100705LBBissell.pdf (noting that the director-friendly business judgment rule is
“thought by some to be over the hill in the post-Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley era”).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act itself seems to assume that both theories—the gatekeeper
theory and the governance theory—played a role in the failures. See Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
7201–7266 (Supp. IV 2004) and in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29
U.S.C. (Supp. III 2003 and Supp. IV 2004)) (imposing regulations on both corporate
gatekeepers and corporate agents).
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Part II of this Comment provides a summary of the events leading up to the failure of Enron and other corporate debacles and sets
12
forth the federal response to the failures thus far. Part II also looks
at Delaware’s relationship with the federal government with respect
to how the fear of federal intrusion shapes state law and judicial opin13
ions. Part II further examines Delaware’s reactions to Enron, noting that Delaware indicated early on an unwillingness to change its
judicial approach to shareholder suits despite the scandals and
14
changes in federal corporate law. Part III provides a general overview of director fiduciary duties and their relationship to the business
15
judgment rule. Part III also includes a brief look at the history of
16
and policies behind the business judgment rule.
Part IV examines recent case law in Delaware implicating the
business judgment rule. Part IV first looks at the Delaware Court of
Chancery’s 1996 decision in In re Caremark International, which re17
sulted in a modification of the standards of director oversight. Part
IV next examines the Court of Chancery’s 2003 decision regarding
the Disney litigation (Disney I), and then moves on to the 2005 decision (Disney II), both of which focus on director due care and good
18
faith. Based on the analysis in Part IV, this Comment concludes that
Delaware courts have, in the past, turned best practices into standards
of conduct and argues that, despite commentary to the contrary, the
Disney I decision is likely to serve as a signal to directors that conduct
falling below the level of best practices will not be readily tolerated in
19
the future.
II. ENRON AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
A. The Downfall
Enron’s downfall resulted from a host of failures: the failure of
the board to supervise properly the management of the company; the
failure of corporate gatekeepers effectively to monitor corporate activity; and the failure of institutional investors, stock analysts, and

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19

See infra Parts II.A, II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.C.1.
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Parts IV.B, IV.C.
See infra Part V.

BAHRI FINAL

1078

10/12/2007 2:01:16 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1075
20

government regulators to realize exactly what was going on. Enron
officials flagrantly abused accounting procedures—manipulating
them to make the company appear substantially more profitable (and
21
therefore a better investment) than it actually was.
The prelude to Enron’s collapse, and the company’s ultimate
22
failure, shocked the corporate world and the investing public. It
23
was initially thought that the shock would wear off before long. The
initial alarm, however, was magnified when similar problems were dis24
covered at WorldCom and other firms.
Investigations relating to
the collapse of Enron and WorldCom indicated that directors failed
in fulfilling their duty to supervise and direct the management of the
25
corporations. With directors seemingly incapable of handling their
26
own affairs, the public demanded a governmental response.
B. Federal Government’s Response to Enron
1.

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act

The federal government’s primary response to the corporate
scandals was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Act” or “Sarbanes27
Oxley”). In passing the Act, Congress attempted to remedy the perceived problems with corporate law that may have led to the financial
28
crises of companies such as Enron and WorldCom. “The centerpiece of Sarbanes-Oxley is internal controls: the checks and balances
that make sure public companies record assets, liabilities, and other
items accurately on financial statements. Under Sarbanes-Oxley,
companies must make sure their controls are sound, then have an
20
D. GORDON SMITH & CYNTHIA A. WILLIAMS, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: CASES,
PROBLEMS, AND CASE STUDIES 312 (2004).
21
Jeffrey D. Van Niel, Enron—The Primer, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS 3, 13 (Nancy B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
22
See William T. Allen, Corporate Governance and a Business Lawyer’s Duty of Independence, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2004).
23
SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 312–13.
24
Id. at 313.
25
E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and Ethics in the Post-Enron/WorldCom
Environment, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839, 839–40 (2003).
26
SMITH & WILLIAMS, supra note 20, at 313.
27
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 (Supp. IV 2004) and in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2003 and Supp. IV 2004)). The Act consists of four laws: the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection
Act of 2002, the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, the
White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002, and the Corporate Fraud Accountability Act of 2002. Id.
28
Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 358.
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29

auditor sign off on them.”
With respect to perceived regulatory
problems in the accounting industry, for example, the Act created an
30
accounting oversight board. Sarbanes-Oxley also instituted new auditing rules in response to the perceived problems with corporate
31
gatekeepers.
Another common link among corporations involved in corporate scandals, which Sarbanes-Oxley seeks to correct, is failure of the
directors to fulfill their fiduciary obligations to the corporations, especially with respect to remaining adequately informed and monitor32
ing the dealings of other corporate actors. In addition to implementing procedures to ensure director independence, a significant
part of the legislation, known as rule 404, seeks to remedy this problem by imposing direct restrictions on corporations’ internal opera33
tions. The rule, which applies to public companies, requires corporations to conduct internal reviews of their own control systems and
then to hire an outside auditor to authenticate the findings of the re34
view.
Similarly, section 302 of the Act “requires a company’s CEO and
CFO to certify in each annual or quarterly report both that they are
responsible for establishing and maintaining internal controls designed to ensure that material information is made known to them
35
and that they have evaluated the effectiveness of those controls.”
Taken together, the rules imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley increase directors’ responsibility to keep themselves adequately informed about
corporate affairs.

29

Diya Gullapalli, Living with Sarbanes-Oxley: How Companies Are Coping in the New
Era of Corporate Governance, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R1.
30
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (Supp. IV 2004):
The board is meant “to oversee the audit of public companies that
are subject to the securities laws, and related matters, in order to
protect the interests of investors and further the public interest in
the preparation of informative, accurate, and independent audit
reports for companies the securities of which are sold to, and held
by and for, public investors.”
Id.
31
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 201(a), 116 Stat. at 771–72.
32
Fairfax, supra note 2, at 398–99.
33
Deborah Solomon, At What Price? Critics Say the Cost of Complying with SarbanesOxley is a lot Higher Than it Should Be, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2005, at R3.
34
Id.
35
Fairfax, supra note 2, at 402.
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C. Interplay Between State Law and Federal Law
Traditionally, the internal operations of corporations have been,
for the most part, governed by the law of their states of incorpora36
tion. Most significantly, this area of state governance includes the
37
relationship between a corporation and its shareholders. The federal government plays a role in certain areas, especially with respect
to the relationship between the corporation and the capital markets,
38
but generally restrains itself from intruding on state matters. The
exception to this rule, as observed by the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley,
is when the government observes conduct on the part of corporations
39
that has the potential to harm the public. When the risk to the public outweighs concerns of federalism, the federal government inter40
venes and regulates the states.
Despite certain attempts on the part of Congress and the SEC,
state law essentially reigned supreme in the arena of corporate law
41
until the early twenty-first century. For example, when the issue of
seemingly excessive executive compensation first came up, both the
SEC and Congress responded by requiring disclosure in an issuer’s
annual proxy statement regarding executive compensation, but these
42
actions had little impact on matters of actual corporate governance.
These measures, adopted in the early 1990s, did not alter the execu43
tive compensation practices of most corporations.
In effect, the
federal government took control of the “external aspects of corporate
behavior” and the states continued to regulate the internal affairs of
44
the corporations.
36

See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478–79 (1977).
Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 354.
38
Id.
39
See Id. at 355. Courts have been reluctant to allow too much federal intrusion
in areas traditionally confined to state authority. Id. at 355–56.
40
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Litigation Reform since the PLSRA: A TenYear Perspective: Panel Three: Sarbanes-Oxley Governance Issues: Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1829 (2006) (noting that “thus far . . . federal intervention [into corporate law] typically has been limited to periods of financial crisis”).
41
Loewenstein, supra note 1, at 355–57.
42
Id. at 356:
“The Commission promulgated a set of rules that dramatically increased the amount of disclosure regarding executive compensation in an issuer’s annual proxy statement . . . . Congress . . .
amend[ed] the tax code to limit the deductibility of executive
compensation in excess of $1 million . . . .”
Id.
43
Id. at 357.
44
Id.
37
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Delaware and the Federal Government

State corporate statutes, especially those in Delaware, are largely
pro-director, vesting corporate board members with a significant
45
amount of power. Delaware generally tries to avoid federal interference, and thus maintain its pro-director stance, by checking its
own laws in response to how it thinks federal law will handle certain
46
issues. Thus, even if matters remain in the domain of state law, the
risk of federal action has the power to influence, and at times dictate,
47
Delaware law. This trend is promoted by the fact that the federal
government has authority to reverse state corporate law with which it
48
does not agree.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act marked the first real attempt on the
part of the federal government to regulate matters traditionally governed by the states, and Delaware was expected to react in a way that
49
Unsurprisingly,
would impede further federal encroachment.
shortly following Enron, Vice Chancellor Strine of the Delaware
Court of Chancery responded by noting that “[r]isk-free capitalism is
an oxymoron, and we endanger much by tampering with a system of
corporate governance that, while imperfect, continues to serve our
50
nation well.” Likewise, Chief Justice E. Norman Veasey of the Delaware Supreme Court stated his opinion that “[c]ourts should be reluctant to interfere with or second-guess the good faith business decisions of directors,” thereby reinforcing the importance of the
51
business judgment doctrine even in the post-Enron context.
These comments reflect a certain disinclination on the part of
the Delaware judiciary to change the way it addresses shareholder derivative actions, and thus the way it examines director conduct.
Courts in general are instructed to “err on the side of the directors”
and to “recognize that directors can only be expected to fulfill” lim52
ited and defined duties. Moreover, Vice Chancellor Strine made a
point of noting that Enron was not a Delaware corporation, again in45

See Fairfax, supra note 2, at 396.
Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591–92 (2003)
(“[W]hen . . . matters formally remain matters of Delaware law, if the risk of federal
action heavily influences Delaware, it follows that even when federal authorities do
not take the issue away, federal power may make Delaware law.”).
47
Id.
48
Id. at 592.
49
See Veasey, supra note 25, at 842, 844.
50
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Derivative Impact? Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law
Implications of the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1374 (Aug. 2002).
51
Veasey, supra note 25, at 849.
52
Strine, supra note 50, at 1393 (emphasis omitted).
46
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dicating an unwillingness to change the way Delaware, in particular,
53
conducts itself. While recognizing that shareholder suits were likely
to continue or, more likely, increase, following Enron, Vice Chancellor Strine indicated no desire to change the way such claims should
54
be evaluated.
55
To be sure, some viewed the decision in Disney I as a “prime example” of Delaware’s reaction to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, noting that
the Act and surrounding talk about corporate governance have
56
“pushed Delaware to view director actions more critically.” But if
the Disney I was a reaction to the potential of federal intrusion, the
Disney II decision was equally a response to critics, who viewed Disney I
57
as being an unreasonable application of the business judgment rule.
Yet as will be seen, Disney II, while not imposing liability on the directors, may have the effect of creating higher standards for director
conduct in the future.
III.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE

A. Fiduciary Duties
Delaware’s reluctance to react to the imminent intrusion of the
federal government following Enron rests in part on the insistence
58
that directors should be left in charge of their corporations. Direc59
tors are fiduciaries of the corporations they manage. Generally, directors have two principal duties—the duty of care and the duty of
60
loyalty. The duty of care covers a director’s individual actions with
respect to the corporation, as well as the director’s obligation to supervise and keep himself or herself informed regarding corporate ac-

53

Id. at 1373 n.5.
See id. at 1374.
55
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005),
aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). See infra Part IV.
56
See, e.g., David Marcus, Disney’s Dudley Do-wrong in Delaware, CORP. CONTROL
ALERT, July 23, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library.
57
See David Marcus, The New Disney Ruling: A Response to Changing Times, DEL. L.
WKLY., Aug. 31, 2005, available at LEXIS, News Library.
58
Veasey, supra note 25, at 842.
59
See, e.g., Harvey Gelb, Director Due Care Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes,
61 TEMP. L. REV. 13, 13–14 (1988) (“In the traditional corporate model the board of
directors, which is elected by the shareholders, is given the ultimate power to manage the corporation. With this grant of power there comes responsibility, and directors are viewed as fiduciaries with certain duties to their corporations.”).
60
WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE,
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 150, 164 (8th ed. 2002).
54
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61

tivity. Under the duty of care, corporate officers and directors are
charged with exercising the care, skill, and prudence of “like persons
62
in a like position” in making corporate decisions. This language
would suggest that directors and officers may be held liable for negligence, yet the imposition of liability for a breach of the duty of care is
63
very rare. As such, the duty is imposed largely as an aspirational
guideline, but on some occasions, it is also used as a liability-creating
64
rule.
Under Delaware law, the standard for proving a violation of the
duty of care, in most cases, is gross negligence with a presumption of
65
good faith in favor of the directors. Further, even where directors
are held to have breached the duty, they can escape liability by prov66
ing the “entire fairness” of the transaction. The “entire fairness”
standard requires directors to prove the transaction had (1) a fair
price (at which point the substantive merits of the decision are con67
sidered), and (2) fair dealing.
The second fiduciary duty, the duty of loyalty, is imposed largely
to prevent officers and directors from using “their position of trust
68
and confidence to further their private interests.” The most common breaches of the duty of loyalty include engaging in self-dealing
transactions, failure to disclose a corporate opportunity to the corporation, unfair competition, and resisting a corporate takeover that
69
may be in the best interest of the shareholders. The duty essentially
requires that a director act in the best interest of the corporation,
putting aside his or her own interests in favor of those of the share70
holders.

61

Fairfax, supra note 2, at 397.
KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 60, at 150.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 151. The situations in which liability is most likely to be imposed are
those involving an undisclosed conflict of interest on the part of the director, or
where the director was knowingly inattentive. See id.
65
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
66
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995).
67
Id. at 1162–63.
68
Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).
69
KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 60, at 165–70.
70
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds by
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 253–54 (Del. 2000).
62
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B. The Business Judgment Rule
1.

General Principles

The business judgment rule is one of the most important doc71
trines in all of corporate law. The rule acts as a shield to director
liability by protecting directors and officers from liability for bad or
harmful business decisions as long as the contested decision was “in72
formed.” Simply put, the business judgment rule is a qualifying rule
on corporate directors’ fiduciary duties, directing courts not to exam73
ine the substantive merits of business decisions.
The business judgment rule protects corporate directors’ deci74
sions from substantive review if four conditions are met. First, the
75
board must exercise its business judgment by making a decision.
Second, the board must utilize a reasonable decision making process,
i.e., board members must take reasonable steps to become adequately
76
informed as to all material information available about the decision.
Third, the board must have acted in good faith in making the deci77
sion. Finally, the decision must have been made by a disinterested
78
board.
The Delaware Supreme Court has described the rule as follows:
It is a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company. Absent an abuse of discretion, that judgment will be respected by the courts. The burden is on the party

71
See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57
VAND. L. REV. 83, 83 (2004) (“The business judgment rule pervades every aspect of
state corporate law, from the review of allegedly negligent decisions by directors, to
self-dealing transactions, . . . and so on.”).
72
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 864 (Del. 1985).
73
See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000). In Brehm, the court expressed its view that the concept of “substantive due care” is “foreign to the business
judgment rule.” Id. Although the business judgment rule affects both of the fiduciary duties, it is most directly tied to the duty of care. See Douglas M. Branson, Intracorporate Process and the Avoidance of Director Liability, 24 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 97–98
(1989).
74
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of
Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 441 (1993).
75
Id. A decision not to act also meets this requirement. Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
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challenging the decision to establish facts rebutting the presump79
tion.

A plaintiff seeking to overcome the business judgment rule must
take several steps. First, the plaintiff must rebut the presumption that
80
the decision was informed. The presumption can be rebutted by a
showing of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing on the part of the directors, or by demonstrating that the directors have made “an unintelli81
gent or unadvised judgment.” Although Delaware courts currently
82
describe the rule as non-substantive, director liability under the
business judgment rule “is predicated upon concepts of gross negli83
gence.” If a plaintiff fails to prove gross negligence with respect to
whether the decision was “informed,” he or she is not entitled to any
84
remedy. If, however, the plaintiff is successful in rebutting the presumption, the burden then shifts to the directors to prove the “trans85
action was entirely fair.”
In the landmark case of Smith v. Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court held the directors of Trans Union Corporation (a public corporation), liable for approving the sale of the company in a
merger transaction essentially because they ignored possible better
86
offers. The court focused on evidence that the board did not spend
adequate time in deciding to approve the merger and that there was
87
Furno documentation to speak of concerning the transaction.
thermore, there was evidence that the corporation’s senior manage88
ment opposed going through with the sale. In light of these procedural defects, the court concluded that the decision could not have
89
been an exercise of proper business judgment.
The Van Gorkom
court thereby applied the business judgment rule to review the
79

Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (internal citations omitted).
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985).
81
Id. (quoting Mitchell v. Highland-W. Glass, 167 A. 831, 833 (Del. Ch. 1933)).
82
See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693, 746–47
(Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006); Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.,
663 A.2d 1156, 1165 (Del. 1995).
83
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873 (quoting Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812).
84
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 (Del. 2001) (internal citations
omitted).
85
Id. (internal citations omitted). For a discussion of the entire fairness standard, see supra Part III.A.
86
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893.
87
Id. at 869, 874. The court relied specifically on evidence that the board agreed
to the transaction after meeting for only two hours, without so much as reviewing a
term sheet of the contemplated transaction. Id.
88
Id. at 867.
89
Id. at 874.
80
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90

method by which the board made the contested decision. Under
this rule, if the process used to make a decision is not reached in an
“informed and deliberate manner,” the directors are not entitled to
91
the protection of the business judgment rule.
2.

Policy Behind the Business Judgment Rule

The business judgment rule can be understood as a device to re92
lieve the pressure on courts to analyze business decisions. From a
judicial perspective, the rule recognizes that courts have little ability
93
to adequately evaluate corporate issues. From a business perspective, the rule recognizes that some risk is required, and even desirable, in the business context. Thus, liability cannot be imposed for
every deviation from paradigmatic conduct on the part of board
94
members.
The business judgment rule embodies the tension between au95
thority and accountability that underlies all of corporate law. On
the one hand, directors need to have enough authority to effectively
96
manage their corporations. On the other hand, there must be rules
in place to hold board members accountable for misuse of their
97
power. This tension has driven much of the controversy over the
98
business judgment rule to date.
IV.

REACTION IN THE COURTS

After Enron, it was expected that there would be a shift toward
imposing more stringent standards on corporate directors to better
99
protect shareholder interests. While some action has been taken on
the federal level, the questions now are what, if anything, has Delaware learned from the corporate failures, and how will it choose to
respond to the changes in federal standards governing corporate law.
The following cases suggest that while the expected shift has not yet

90

Id. at 874–88.
Id. at 873.
92
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
93
See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693, 746 (Del.
Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
94
Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052–53 (Del. Ch. 1996).
95
See Bainbridge, supra note 71, at 84.
96
Id. at 84–85.
97
Id.
98
See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate
Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 11–12 (2005).
99
See generally Bissel, supra note 11.
91
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fully occurred, change is in the air—change that will serve to protect
shareholders from rampant managerial opportunism.
A. In re Caremark
Apart from their decision-making function, corporate directors
are charged with the responsibility of monitoring the corporation’s
100
management.
This duty includes oversight of the corporation’s
101
policies with respect to compliance with laws and regulations.
While compliance with the law is generally advisable, it has never
been clearly established that boards are required to ensure such com102
103
pliance. In re Caremark is illustrative of this point.
Caremark International, Inc. was engaged in providing health
104
care services.
It was prosecuted for violating the federal AntiReferral Payments Law for making certain “consulting” and “research” payments to health care providers who recommended pa105
Caremark ultimately settled with both the govtients to Caremark.
106
ernment and various private entities for more than $250 million.
Based on the events of the criminal proceedings, several derivative ac107
tions were filed against Caremark.
Caremark also settled these
claims, promising to discontinue the disputed practices and to create
108
a new compliance committee.
In In re Caremark, the Delaware Court of Chancery was called
109
upon to evaluate the resulting settlement agreement. The underlying suit alleged breach of fiduciary duty on the part of the directors
for failure to detect and correct violations of state and federal law by
110
While approving the settlement as
certain Caremark employees.
fair and reasonable, the court established that directors may be held
personally liable for losses resulting from a corporation’s failure to
111
Further, the deact in accordance with applicable legal standards.

100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

See Brown, supra note 5, at 14–15.
Id.
Id. at 6.
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
Id. at 961.
Id. at 964.
Id. at 961.
Id. at 964.
Id. at 966.
698 A.2d at 960–61.
Id. at 960.
Id. at 970.
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cision suggested an elevation of directors’ monitoring duties.
Chancellor Allen, who authored the opinion, determined that:

112

[A] director’s obligation includes a duty to attempt in good faith
to assure that a corporate information and reporting system,
which the board concludes is adequate, exists, and that failure to
do so under some circumstances may, in theory at least, render a
director liable for losses caused by non-compliance with applica113
ble legal standards.

The Chancellor’s suggestion that boards should be responsible
for ensuring corporate compliance with the laws was influenced by
the “increasing tendency, especially under federal law, to employ the
criminal law to assure corporate compliance with external legal re114
Specifically, the Chancellor found that the adoption
quirements.”
of the federal Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations—which imposed enhanced penalties on corporations convicted of crimes—
provided “powerful incentives for corporations” to implement effec115
tive compliance systems.
The 1963 decision of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., however,
provided that “absent cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the
directors to install and operate a corporate system of espionage to
116
ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.”
Chancellor Allen was able to distinguish Graham by interpreting it to
stand for the proposition that “absent grounds to suspect deception,
neither corporate boards nor senior officers can be charged with
wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of employees and the
117
honesty of their dealings on the company’s behalf.” Further, an interpretation of Graham that “a corporate board has no responsibility
to assure that appropriate information and reporting systems are established by management . . . would not, in any event, be accepted by
118
Again relying on the new
the Delaware Supreme Court in 1996.”
federal Sentencing Guidelines for support, the court found that
“[a]ny rational person attempting in good faith to meet an organizational governance responsibility would be bound to take [the en119
hanced penalties] into account . . . .”

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119

Id.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
Id. at 969.
In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969.
188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963).
In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 969.
Id. at 969–70.
Id. at 970.
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Caremark was not an official ruling on the subject and arguably
120
undermined existing Delaware Supreme Court precedent. The decision has, however, been influential with respect to the conduct of
121
Delaware corporations.
For example, it is now standard practice
for corporate attorneys to advise clients to adopt comprehensive
compliance programs, providing for increased communication with
employees, rigorous monitoring and auditing, and discipline for per122
Furthermore, Caremark’s proposition that comceived violations.
pliance with the laws is part of a directors’ duty to monitor “finds substantial agreement and support in the corporate governance thinking
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, the American Law Insti123
tute, and the American Bar Association.”
While articulating what were essentially best practices, the proposed standards that came out of Caremark opinion have been taken
124
to heart by both business entities and the courts. The decision has
successfully heightened the level of attention directors pay to their
125
Caremark thereoversight responsibilities under the duty of care.
fore suggests that best practices can evolve into the industry standard
with respect to director duties in Delaware.
B. Disney I
1.

The Facts

Before delving into the most recent in the string of decisions
that came out of the Disney shareholder litigation, it is useful to look
at the Delaware Court of Chancery’s 2003 opinion regarding this
case. The facts of the case are briefly summarized here. Disney’s
Chairman and CEO, Michael Eisner, sought to engage Michael Ovitz
126
as its new president.
In October of 1995, Eisner eventually suc127
ceeded, but only after offering Ovitz an enticing contract.

120

Veasey, supra note 25, at 850.
See Brown, supra note 5, at 6.
122
KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 60, at 155.
123
Brown, supra note 5, at 31–32.
124
See Veasey, supra note 25, at 849–50 (“Such compliance systems could reasonably be expected to identify wrongdoing when a compliance program could benefit
the corporation under federal sentencing guidelines . . . . [M]y personal view is that
the expectations of directors . . . progressed in the thirty-plus years from Graham to
Caremark.”).
125
Brown, supra note 5, at 144.
126
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693, 700–01 (Del.
Ch. 2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
127
Id. at 703, 711.
121

BAHRI FINAL

1090

10/12/2007 2:01:16 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 37:1075

The most interesting provision of the contract, and indeed the
provision from which the litigation arose, was the provision concerning the termination of the contract. Ovitz’s employment agreement
(OEA) provided certain terms under which Ovitz would be permitted
128
to leave the company without penalty.
If Ovitz left for any other
reason, he would forfeit any right to outstanding benefits under the
129
OEA and could be prevented “from working for a competitor.”
If,
on the other hand, Ovitz was fired without cause (that is, for any reason besides gross negligence or malfeasance), Disney would be
obliged to make a payment—the non-fault termination (NFT)—
consisting of his remaining salary under the OEA and $7.5 million a
130
In addition, the first
year, which represented unaccrued bonuses.
tranche of Ovitz’s options would vest immediately upon termination,
and he would receive a payment of $10 million for the second
131
tranche.
As is often the case with Hollywood power couples, what was expected to be a happy marriage between Eisner and Ovitz faded very
quickly. Problems, largely due to Ovitz’s failure to adapt to Disney’s
corporate culture, arose as early as January 1996, just three months
132
after his tenure as president officially began. By the fall of the same
year, it became apparent that the difficulties were not likely to be resolved, and that Ovitz, one way or another, would have to leave the
133
company.
In September of 1996, Sanford Litvack, Disney’s general counsel,
approached Ovitz and advised him that it would be best if Ovitz
134
started looking for new employment. Litvack further conveyed that
135
Ovitz contemplated
“Eisner no longer wanted Ovitz at Disney.”
[T]he non-contentious terms of Ovitz’s employment agreement (the
“OEA”) were $1 million in annual salary and a performance-based, discretionary bonus . . . . Ovitz would receive a five-year contract with two
tranches of options. The first tranche consisted of three million options . . . and if the value of those options at the end of the five years
had not appreciated to $50 million, Disney would make up the difference. The second tranche consisted of two million options that would
vest immediately if Disney and Ovitz opted to renew the contract.
Id. at 703 (internal citations omitted).
128
Id. at 703–04.
129
Id. at 704 (internal citations omitted).
130
Id.
131
Id. at 704.
132
Disney II, 907 A.2d at 713 (noting that the other board members found Ovitz “a
little elitist for the egalitarian Walt Disney [employees]”).
133
Id. at 714.
134
Id. at 724.
135
Id.
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employment at Sony, but things did not work out, leaving Disney with
136
seemingly only one option—to terminate Ovitz. Ovitz was officially
137
terminated, without cause, effective December 12, 1996. Under the
terms of his contract, Ovitz was entitled to the NFT, which was valued
138
at over $140 million.
2.

The Suit

Following Ovitz’s termination, plaintiff shareholders initiated
the derivative action, alleging that the Disney directors breached
their fiduciary duties to the corporation, first in approving the OEA,
and again in terminating Ovitz without cause, thereby entitling him
139
to the receipt of the NFT.
Plaintiffs sought money damages from
defendant directors and Ovitz and/or rescission of the termination
agreement, or compensation for Disney’s alleged damages “and dis140
gorgement of Ovitz’s unjust enrichment.”
In its 2003 decision, the Delaware Court of Chancery determined that, based on an investigation of the “tools at hand,” plaintiffs
alleged sufficient facts that, “if true, arguably support . . . plaintiffs’
claims for relief . . . and are sufficient to excuse demand and to state
141
claims that warrant development of a full record.”
Specifically, the
court was referring to allegations that Eisner made the decision to
hire Ovitz unilaterally and without fully informing the rest of the
board about the employment agreement, and that the board likewise
played virtually no role in deciding the terms of Ovitz’s termina142
tion.
In considering defendants’ motion to dismiss, the court phrased
the issue as whether the plaintiffs alleged “particularized facts that
raise doubt about whether the challenged transaction is entitled to
143
In finding for the
the protection of the business judgment rule.”
plaintiffs, the court held that “[a] fair reading of the . . . complaint . .
. gives rise to a reason to doubt whether the board’s actions were
144
The court further found
taken honestly and in good faith . . . .”
that “the facts belie any assertion that the . . . Boards exercised any
136

Id. at 728.
Id. at 734.
138
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 825 A.2d 275, 279, 286 (Del.
Ch. 2003).
139
Id. at 277–79.
140
Id. at 278.
141
Id. at 279.
142
Id. at 287–89.
143
Id. at 285–86.
144
Disney I, 825 A.2d at 286.
137
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business judgment or made any good faith attempt to fulfill the fidu145
The court
ciary duties they owed to Disney and its shareholders.”
therefore found that the evidence presented raised a “reason to
doubt” that defendants should be afforded the protection of the
146
business judgment rule.
C. Disney II
The Delaware Court of Chancery rendered its decision regard147
The stage was set for
ing the Disney litigation in August of 2005.
148
the court to do a “rigorous job of protecting shareholders.”
The
court, however, ruled for defendants on all counts, holding that the
accused board members had not breached their fiduciary duties to
the corporation and that the decision to terminate Ovitz and to make
149
The Court
the subsequent NFT payment did not constitute waste.
of Chancery further confirmed the viability of the business judgment
rule, declaring that “fiduciaries who act faithfully and honestly on
behalf of those whose interests they represent are indeed granted
wide latitude in their efforts to maximize shareholders’ invest150
ment.” After a brief review of the history of the rule, the court went
on to examine whether the protections of the rule should apply to
151
each defendant on a director-by-director basis.
1.

The Decision to Hire Ovitz

The court first concluded that Eisner did not breach his duty of
care in deciding to hire Ovitz via the extension of a highly lucrative
152
employment contract.
“[L]iability for a breach of the duty of care

145

Id. at 287.
Id. at 289–90.
147
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
148
Fairfax, supra note 2, at 419 (quoting Marc Gunther, Ovitz v. Eisner: Boards Beware!, FORTUNE, Nov. 10, 2003, at 176). In fact, following the Disney I decision, former Delaware Court of Chancery Judge William Allen noted that the decision could
hint that “the Delaware courts are responding to the Enron and WorldCom headlines and the intrusion, so to speak, of the federal government into the internal governance of corporations.” Id. at 418 (internal citations omitted). According to Fairfax, this statement “confirmed the impact that Enron and Sarbanes-Oxley had on
Delaware courts’ willingness to increase directors’ liability in order to ensure greater
adherence to directors’ fiduciary responsibilities.” Id. at 418.
149
Disney II, 907 A.2d at 697. This decision was later affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 35–36 (Del. 2006).
150
Disney II, 907 A.2d at 697–98.
151
Id. at 756–79.
152
Id. at 762.
146
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can arise . . . ‘from a board decision that results in a loss because that
decision was ill advised or ‘negligent’ . . . [or] from an unconsidered
failure of the board to act in circumstances in which due attention
153
would, arguably, have prevented the loss.’” Any decision made by a
director, of course, is entitled to the protections of the business
judgment rule, which raises the standard of review to gross negli154
gence.
Based on a prior ruling, the court determined that a consideration of any improper motives or non-independence of the board
155
members would not be appropriate.
The court therefore framed
the issue of Eisner’s liability as whether plaintiffs could “demonstrate
by a preponderance of the evidence that Eisner was either grossly
negligent or acted in bad faith in connection with Ovitz’s hiring and
156
the approval of the OEA.” “[I]n order for a plaintiff to successfully
plead that the directors acted with gross negligence . . . the plaintiff
should articulate ‘facts that suggest a wide disparity between the process the directors used . . . and that which would have been ra157
tional.’”
Here, Eisner made the decision to hire Ovitz, as well as what
158
terms to offer him, virtually unilaterally.
Two members of the
159
The corporation’s comboard initially denounced the decision.
pensation committee met for only one hour to review the anticipated
160
terms of the OEA, and this was not the only subject of the meeting.
At an executive meeting held later the same day, the board voted
161
unanimously to elect Ovitz as Disney’s new president. By this point,
Ovitz and Eisner had already signed a letter agreement outlining the
terms of Ovitz’s employment, and a press release had been made an162
nouncing Ovitz’s hiring.
Despite these factual findings, the court dismissed all charges
against defendants, spending a good deal of its time distinguishing
153
Id. at 749 (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967
(Del. Ch. 1996)).
154
Id. at 762.
155
Id. at 762 n.495 (citing Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 257–58 (Del. 2000)).
156
Disney II, 907 A.2d at 762.
157
Id. at 750 n.429 (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 n.39 (Del. Ch.
2003)).
158
Id. at 762.
159
Id. at 706.
160
Id. at 708.
161
Id. at 710.
162
Disney II, 907 A.2d at 708. Both of these events took place on August 14, 1995.
Id. The compensation committee meeting was held on September 26, 1995, and
Ovitz officially assumed his position on October 1, 1995. Id. at 708, 711.
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163

Disney II from Van Gorkom. While noting that the factual similarities
between the two cases were “striking,” the court ultimately distin164
First, the court found
guished Van Gorkom on four main grounds.
that the transaction in Van Gorkom was “fundamentally different”
from the one at issue in Disney II because the merger decision in Van
Gorkom was more material to Trans Union than was the decision to
165
hire Ovitz to Disney. Second, although the board in Disney II spent
less time in making its decision than did the Trans Union board, the
166
Third, unlike the members of
time spent was “not insignificant.”
the Trans Union board, the Disney board was “provided with a term
sheet of the key terms of the OEA and a presentation was made by
167
Finally, whereas Trans Union’s
[knowledgeable board members].”
senior managers were in complete opposition to the merger, Disney’s
management “generally saw Ovitz’s hiring as a boon for the Com168
pany.”
In distinguishing the cases in such a manner, the court drew a
very fine line between rational and irrational action. Indeed, similarly to Van Gorkom, a press release announcing Ovitz’s hiring was
made before the board had voted on the issue, and before most of the
169
board was fully informed about the issue. In fact, an argument can
163

Id. at 766–70.
Id. at 767.
165
Id. at 768 n.533 (noting that Eisner’s procedure of entering into the letter
agreement without prior board authorization and the compensation committee’s
approval of the OEA “based upon a term sheet and upon less than an hour of discussion, seem[ ] eminently reasonable given the OEA’s (relatively small) economic
size”). The consideration of the reasonableness of the decision based on economic
terms runs counter to the basic premise of the business judgment rule that courts
should not evaluate the substantive merits of board decisions. Courts should not be
swayed by the economic reasonableness of a transaction if the process by which the
decision was reached is fundamentally flawed. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858, 875 (Del. 1985) (“[I]n the absence of other sound valuation information, the
fact of a premium alone does not provide an adequate basis upon which to assess the
fairness of an offering price.”).
166
Disney II, 907 A.2d at 768.
167
Id. at 769.
168
Id.
169
The court tried to downplay this fact by noting that the directors’ “level of
knowledge or involvement before [the date of the meeting] is only relevant insofar
as it informs the Court as to their accumulated knowledge on September 26, when
the business judgment was made” and that the letter agreement “was expressly subject to the approval of the board and compensation committee.” Disney II, 907 A.2d
at 767 n.522. This assertion seems contrary to the principle presented in Van Gorkom
that “[t]he determination of whether a business judgment is an informed one turns
on whether the directors have informed themselves prior to making a business decision,
of all material information reasonably available to them.” Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at
872 (emphasis added) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
164
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be made that Eisner’s conduct was worse than that of Trans Union’s
Chairman and CEO, Jerome W. Van Gorkom. Van Gorkom at least
170
presented the illusion that other courses of action were possible.
Here, there were no alternatives—Eisner wanted Ovitz and only
Ovitz.
Another distinction, not emphasized by the court, is that in Van
Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme Court analyzed the board as a
171
whole.
The Disney II court evaluated liability on a director-bydirector basis, indicating that the duty of care is a duty owed by each
172
individual director as an individual.
Since no one director’s conduct on his own was worthy of culpability, the court could not impose
173
liability on any one of them. This result gives rise to the question of
whether a different decision would have been reached if the board
had been examined collectively.
2.

The Decision to Terminate Ovitz

The court also concluded that Eisner, who “alone possessed the
authority to terminate Ovitz and grant him the NFT,” did not breach
174
his fiduciary duties and acted in good faith taking such action. In a
statement of seeming sympathy for Eisner, the court noted, “Eisner
unexpectedly found himself confronted with a situation that did not
175
have an easy solution.”
The court found that Eisner was entitled, in his capacity as CEO,
to make what he considered to be the “best” decision regarding how
176
to handle the problems with Ovitz.
The court further concluded
that Eisner was entitled to rely on defendant Litvack’s statement that
he had consulted with outside counsel with regard to whether Ovitz
could be fired with cause, notwithstanding the court’s declaration
that it was “not convinced that Litvack did indeed speak with [outside
177
counsel] regarding the cause issue.”
3.

Ideal Practices Distinguished From Legal Practices

Notwithstanding its decision in favor of defendants, the court
did acknowledge that the Disney board, especially Eisner, was respon170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177

Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 868.
Id. at 889.
Disney II, 907 A.2d at 760.
Id.
Id. at 777–78.
Id. at 778.
Id.
Id. at 778 n.591.
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178

sible for some wrongdoing.
The court hedged this view, however,
by proclaiming that “[t]his court strongly encourages directors and
officers to employ best practices . . . . But Delaware law does not—
indeed, the common law cannot—hold fiduciaries liable for a failure
179
to comply with the aspirational ideal of best practices . . . .”
This statement, on its face, could be an indication that Delaware
will be applying the business judgment rule strictly in the future.
Upon closer consideration of the opinion as a whole, however, a different conclusion can be drawn. While the court ruled for the defendants, it noted that “[f]or the future, many lessons of what not to
180
do can be learned from defendants’ conduct here.”
Additionally,
and perhaps more significantly, the court stated:
Recognizing the protean nature of ideal corporate governance
practices, particularly over an era that has included the Enron
and WorldCom debacles, and the resulting legislative focus on
corporate governance, it is perhaps worth pointing out that the
actions (and the failures to act) of the Disney board that gave rise
to this lawsuit took place ten years ago, and that applying 21st century notions of best practices in analyzing whether those decisions were ac181
tionable would be misplaced.
182

This statement is undoubtedly reminiscent of Caremark and its reference to changes in federal regulations. It can therefore be viewed
st
as an indication that cases in which the “21 century notions of best
183
practices” need to be applied will arise in the future.
Further, while it is not entirely clear what those best practices
may be, the Disney II court did provide some guidance on this matter.
For example, the court suggested that more detailed documentation
184
In discussing the minutes of the
might be required in the future.
178

Disney II, 907 A.2d at 760–61. For example, the court recognized that
Eisner to a large extent is responsible for the failings in process that infected and handicapped the board’s decisionmaking abilities. Eisner
stacked his (and I intentionally write ‘his’ as opposed to ‘the Company’s’) board of directors with friends and acquaintances who . . .
were certainly more willing to accede to his wishes and support unconditionally than truly independent directors.
Id. The court further noted that “Eisner’s actions in connection with Ovitz’s hiring
should not serve as a model for fellow executives and fiduciaries to follow. His lapses
were many. . . . He stretched the outer boundaries of his authority as CEO by acting without
specific board direction or involvement.” Id. at 762–63 (emphasis added).
179
Id. at 697.
180
Id. at 760.
181
Id. at 697 (emphasis added).
182
In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
183
Disney II, 907 A.2d at 697.
184
Id. at 768 n.539.
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board meeting at which the OEA was approved, the court noted that
“[i]t would have been extremely helpful to the Court if the minutes
had indicated in any fashion that the discussion relating to the OEA
was longer and more substantial than the discussion relating to the
myriad of other issues brought before the compensation committee
185
that morning.”
In addition, with respect to expert advice, the court observed
that while it is not “necessary for an expert to make a formal presentation at the committee meeting in order for the board to rely on that
expert’s analysis, . . . that certainly would have been the better course
186
The court further seemed troubled by Eisner’s “Maof action.”
chiavellian (and imperial) nature as CEO,” thus suggesting that
Delaware will be looking more closely at the issue of director inde187
pendence in the future. While the court did not go so far as to say
explicitly that such issues would play a more important role in future
cases, there was the implication that these suggestions should be
heeded seriously.
V. A NEW STANDARD FOR DIRECTOR CONDUCT?
Disney II teaches important lessons about what is expected of directors—lessons that boards seem to be in need of in recent times.
While insufficient to impose liability, the conduct characterized as
“ordinary negligence” by the Disney II court provides insight as to how
board members can meet the “[a]spirational ideals of good corporate
governance practices . . . that go beyond the minimal legal require188
ments” —requirements that were apparently satisfied by the Disney
board. The board should take an active role in the management of
the business, not leaving the CEO to “enthrone[ ] himself as the omnipotent and infallible monarch of his [own] personal Magic King189
dom . . . .” Further, directors should fully inform themselves, using
all available resources, before making critical decisions affecting the
190
company, and fully document any and all board meetings.
These lessons, taken together with Caremark, have implications
for director conduct and the business judgment rule in Delaware. If
one likens Sarbanes-Oxley to the federal Sentencing Guidelines that
motivated the decision in Caremark, one can readily conclude that
185
186
187
188
189
190

Id.
Id. at 769.
Id. at 760.
Id. at 745 n.399 (citing Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000)).
Disney II, 907 A.2d at 763.
See id. at 764–65.
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boards will be strongly encouraged, if not required, to hold them191
selves to higher standards in future corporate decision-making. After all, as Caremark has shown, best practices can evolve into the industry standard—especially when encouraged by courts and new
192
federal regulations.
The business judgment rule remains an “elusive” aspect of cor193
porate law, yet Disney provides clues as to its ultimate formulation in
Delaware. While critics of the rule argue either that it allows direc194
tors too much freedom in corporate decision-making or that it re195
stricts directors from properly exercising their management duties,
the relevant case law reveals that any restrictions imposed by the
business judgment rule can be better explained by examining the
context in which it is applied. While the basic definitions of fiduciary
duties may not change over time, history may change the way in
196
which those definitions are utilized.
Where the historical context
requires a heightening of the standards by which director conduct is
to be judged (for example, following a series of corporate scandals
implicating director action/inaction), any application of the business
judgment rule should be altered accordingly. The logical result is as
follows: the higher the standards against which director conduct is
examined, the less likely it is that the business judgment rule will protect decisions that do not conform to those standards. Viewed this
way, the rule seeks to restrict director conduct only as far as is necessary to ensure that directors conduct themselves in accordance with
their fiduciary obligations.
Thus, if Delaware directors heed the “suggestions” of Disney II,
this decision has the potential to reshape the way shareholder derivative actions are reviewed. The business judgment rule would still not
examine substantive decisions. The rule would only look at the procedural aspect of a board’s decision making, asking either “was the
decision informed or in bad faith?” or “based on the procedures, was

191
See Veasey, supra note 25, at 850 (“Today, the ‘utter failure’ to follow the minimum expectations of the evolving standards of director conduct [and] the minimum
expectations of Sarbanes-Oxley . . . might . . . raise a good-faith issue.”).
192
See Brown, supra note 5, at 6. Brown noted that the Caremark decision “has fueled the discussion of the board’s role in ensuring compliance. . . . As a result, directors would be well advised to attend to the corporation’s compliance efforts, even in
the absence of a definitive statement of the board’s responsibility.” Id.
193
Id. at 11.
194
See generally Fairfax, supra note 2.
195
See generally Bainbridge, supra note 71.
196
In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch.
2005), aff’d, 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
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this a breach of fiduciary duty?” The difference, that which will hold
directors more accountable, will be the scrutiny with which procedures are examined. For example, a decision may be “uninformed” if
there are inadequate minutes to show what was actually discussed at a
board meeting, or if the board did not consult an expert with respect
to the decision. Additionally, a failure to comply with the provisions
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act could be considered to be in bad faith. In
short, the best practices articulated by the Delaware Court of Chancery have the potential to become the new standards against which
director conduct is measured when evaluating a breach of fiduciary
duty claim.
IV.

CONCLUSION

While it may be true that courts cannot impose liability upon
corporate directors for deviating from paradigmatic conduct, it is also
true that both courts and directors need guidance when it comes to
evaluating decisions in a way to promote the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. Based on the progression of the Disney
litigation, it became clear that a shift toward more stringent standards
for directors was expected, at least up to the point of the 2005 decision. It is also clear, however, that such a shift did not occur. But the
Disney decision does provide clues for the future.
As the Delaware Court of Chancery itself noted, “[u]nlike ideals
of corporate governance, a fiduciary’s duties do not change over
time. How we understand those duties may evolve and become refined, but the duties themselves have not changed, except to the extent
197
that fulfilling a fiduciary duty requires obedience to other positive law.”
This statement likely refers to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and to other
acts that may be passed in the future, perhaps some as a result of
Delaware’s inaction in this instance.
But the statement may have more broad-reaching implications.
After all, the nature of fiduciary duties, like ideals of corporate gov198
ernance, needs to change with the “law” of society.
This change
can be accomplished by applying the business judgment rule by
measuring director conduct against those “ideals of corporate governance.” The business judgment rule examines board procedures.
If those procedures are required to comport with the ideals, or at
least above average standards, of corporate governance, the business
judgment rule will become a mechanism whereby courts can mean197
198

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
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ingfully evaluate board decisions without sacrificing either accountability or authority.
Perhaps the Delaware Court of Chancery can be taken at its
word that one of the reasons no liability was imposed on the Disney
directors was that the conduct in question took place ten years before
the collapse of Enron. If this is the case, the business judgment rule
will look somewhat different in the future. While preventing review
of the substantive decisions of directors, the rule’s presumption may
be overcome by a showing of a violation of one of the suggested procedures in Disney. In any event, the Delaware Court of Chancery,
through its decision in Disney, has sent a powerful message to corporate directors: even though fiduciary duties do not change, standards
of director conduct do, and directors should be prepared to meet the
standards implicitly imposed by the court in Disney in the future.

